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Abstract
We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial
venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s op-
erations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and
quite diﬀerent from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In
particular, our framework generates a rationale for ﬁrm decline. As young ﬁrms
accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur
(inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on
growing, capital and ﬁrm value start declining and so does the value of outside
equity. The reason is that incentive provision becomes costlier as inside equity
grows. In turn, this leads to a decline in the constrained–eﬃcient level of eﬀort
and therefore to a drop in the return to investment. In the long run, the en-
trepreneur gains control of all cash–ﬂow rights and the capital stock converges to
a constant value.
Key words. Principal–Agent, Moral Hazard, Hidden Action, Incentives, Firm
Dynamics.
JEL Codes: D82, D86, D92, G32.
∗We are very grateful to Dave Backus, Heski Bar–Isaac, Alberto Bisin, Andre De Souza, Kose
John, and Tom Sargent, as well seminar attendants at the Minneapolis Fed, NYU, the 2008 Midwest
Macro Conference in Philadelphia, SED Meeting in Cambridge, and EEA conference in Milan, for
their comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own responsibility.
†Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University and RCEA. Email:
clem@nyu.edu. Web: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/˜gclement
‡Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University and NBER. Email:
tcooley@stern.nyu.edu. Web: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/˜tcooley/
§Centro de Investigaci´ on y Docencia Econ´ omicas, M´ exico D.F., M´ exico.
Email: sonia.digiannatale@cide.edu.
Web: http://www.cide.edu/investigador/proﬁle.php?IdInvestigador=1791 Introduction
Think of an investor who provides seed ﬁnancing to an entrepreneurial ﬁrm. The
success of her investment will depend crucially on the eﬀort that the entrepreneur
puts in. Yet, the incentives of the two individuals are not perfectly aligned, as the
entrepreneur bears the whole cost of such eﬀort while sharing the pecuniary returns
with the investor. When it is diﬃcult to monitor the entrepreneur’s conduct, the in-
vestor will implement an incentive scheme that links rewards to observables. However,
if the entrepreneur is risk–averse, incentive provision will be costly.
This problem can be conveniently cast as a model of inﬁnitely repeated bilateral
exchange with hidden action, along the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Wang
(1997). The only caveat is that in their models there is no notion of important features
of ﬁrm dynamics such as production and capital accumulation. The purpose of this
paper is to explicitly model both of them. We do so by assuming that the entrepreneur
is equipped with a production function that exhibits decreasing returns and is hit by
multiplicative shocks whose probability distribution depends in a natural way on
entrepreneurial eﬀort.
The incentive scheme chosen by the investor belongs to the set of constrained–
eﬃcient allocations, which in turn consist of sequences of eﬀort provision, payouts,
and investment, that maximize the value of the investor’s claim (outside equity) for
given rewards to the entrepreneur.
Our analysis generates three key insights. The ﬁrst is that the marginal value
of investment is decreasing in the value of the entrepreneur’s claim (inside equity).
The intuition is as follows. When the entrepreneur’s utility function belongs to the
CRRA class, incentive provision is costlier, the greater the value of her claim to the
venture’s cash ﬂows. In turn this means that, everything else equal, the constrained–
eﬃcient level of eﬀort provision decreases as the entrepreneur accumulates wealth. By
reducing the likelihood of a high productivity shock, this results in a lower marginal
value of investment.
The second result, a corollary to the ﬁrst, is what we call capital overshooting.
When agents discount future utility ﬂows at the same rate and the entrepreneur’s
RRA coeﬃcient is strictly less than 1, the stochastic process for ﬁrm size converges to
a singleton. This result is in common with other models in the literature on repeated
moral hazard. What is diﬀerent here is that convergence may be from above. It
is well known that young ﬁrms tend to be relatively small. This means that their
1marginal product of capital is high, and so are their investment rates. Capital grows.
At the same time, optimal incentive provision implies that on average inside equity
also grows over time. These two forces have countervailing eﬀects on eﬀort, but the
ﬁrst dominates. Eﬀort provision increases and the distribution of the shock improves.
Firm value also increases. However, as inside equity increases, the marginal value
of investment decreases. Eventually, capital and eﬀort start declining, and so does
ﬁrm value. In the limit all cash ﬂows accrue to the entrepreneur. Capital, eﬀort, and
inside equity are constant and strictly positive.
Finally, our theory produces a novel justiﬁcation for the limited span of control
argument, which became popular thanks to the pioneering work by Lucas (1978).
Such argument consists in positing that the amount of productive resources that it is
eﬃcient to put under a manager’s control is bounded. In our scenario, this outcome
results from the interaction between informational friction and capital accumulation.
Limiting the amount of resources under management is the optimal response to the
rise in the cost of incentive provision that follows from the increase in entrepreneurial
wealth.
Consistently with Rogerson (1985a), we ﬁnd that the dynamics we have just de-
scribed is sensitive to our assumptions on preferences. When the entrepreneur is
either relatively more impatient or her RRA coeﬃcient is greater than 1, the model
allows for a non–degenerate stationary distribution of ﬁrm size, ﬁrm value, and its
split between the two agents.
We consider two extensions of our framework. In one, productivity shocks are
persistent. Success in the current period improves the ﬁrm’s future prospects. This
version of the model has a stationary distribution where the value of outside equity
is still zero, but eﬀort, investment, and inside equity are time–varying. In the other
extension, we assume that the marginal cost of eﬀort depends non–trivially on capital.
We ﬁnd that the qualitative features of ﬁrm dynamics we have just described survive
in this more general setup.
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature that explores the im-
plications of moral hazard for ﬁrm dynamics. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004)
and Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004) consider scenarios where the entrepreneur
has limited commitment, while Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Brusco and Ropero
(2007), Quadrini (2003) and DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2008) study the case
of hidden information.
Our framework has also close ties to models that allow for capital accumulation
2in environments where market incompleteness is caused by moral hazard. Among
these, the closest work is by Bohacek (2005), who provides conditions under which an
economy ` a la Atkeson and Lucas (1995) admits a stationary and ergodic distribution
of consumption.1 Other papers in this class include Marcet and Marimon (1992),
Khan and Ravikumar (2001), and Espino (2005).
Finally, our paper also belongs to a large literature, started by Holmstrom (1979)’s
seminal contribution, that analyzes constrained–eﬃcient allocations in principal–agent
models with hidden action. Our work is part of the more recent tradition, started
by Rogerson (1985b), that explicitly considers repeated relationships. In particular,
our model extends Spear and Srivastava (1987), allowing for production and capital
accumulation. Notice that a number of papers in this tradition, among which Wang
(1997) and Clementi, Cooley, and Wang (2006), have interpreted the principal–agent
relationship as one between shareholders and executives. This alternative interpreta-
tion is also valid for our model.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in
Section 2. The properties of the optimal contract are characterized in Section 3. We
ﬁnd that the most eﬃcient way of building intuition for those properties is to brieﬂy
consider two special cases of our environment, namely one with no dynamics and one
with dynamics but no capital accumulation. Section 4 is dedicated to comparative
statics exercises. We then consider two extensions. In Section 5, we allow for the
marginal utility cost of eﬀort to depend on the level of the capital stock. In Section
6 we assume that shocks are autocorrelated. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1,2,... There are two agents, who we will refer
to as investor and entrepreneur, respectively. The latter is endowed with a production
technology, that produces a homogeneous good with capital as the only input. Output
(yt) is given by
yt = θtf(kt),
where kt ∈ [k,k] ∈ <+ and where θt ∈ Θ ⊆ <+ is a random variable distributed
according to the time–invariant distribution function G(θt|at). The variable at ∈ A ≡
1Our model is quite similar to his component planner problem. The main diﬀerence between such
problem and ours is that Bohacek (2005)’s component planner is not bound by a period–by–period
limited liability constraint. In other words, component planners rent capital on spot markets.
3[a,a] ∈ <+ denotes entrepreneurial eﬀort. We assume that G has a density denoted by
g, which is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to a, and that Θ is compact.
While the output of the production process is public information, the eﬀort exerted
by the entrepreneur is her private information.
At time t = 0, the investor provides the entrepreneur with capital k0. We assume
that any further investment must be ﬁnanced with resources produced internally.
Therefore it must be the case that, at all t,
ct + xt ≤ θtf(kt),
where ct ≥ 0 is the entrepreneur’s consumption and xt ≥ 0 represents investment.
The law of motion for capital is the usual one:
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + xt,
where δ ∈ (0,1) denotes the depreciation rate. The last two conditions imply the
following resource constraint:
ct ≤ θtf(kt) + (1 − δ)kt − kt+1.
We assume that the investor is risk–neutral, while the entrepreneur is risk–averse.
The latter’s static preferences are represented by the utility function u(ct) − a.2 The
function u is assumed to be bounded, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Agents
discount future utility streams at the common rate β ∈ (0,1).3
We allow investor and entrepreneur to employ history–dependent pure strategies.
If we let h0 denote the empty history, then the history at time t ≥ 1 is given by the
sequence ht = h0 ∪ {(θs,ks)}t
s=1. The investor’s task is to oﬀer the entrepreneur an
incentive scheme (contract) σ = {at(ht−1,kt),ct(ht)}∞





t=1. This notation reﬂects the assumption, typical in
neoclassical macroeconomics, that investment is chosen at the beginning of every
period, before the realization of the shock. The entrepreneur’s strategy consists of
the sequence {at(ht−1,kt)}∞
t=1.
The continuation proﬁle of a contract σ from date t+1 on, given ht,kt+1, is denoted
as σ|ht,kt+1. Conditional on the entrepreneur following the action recommendation
2All the formal results that follow are proven for a more general speciﬁcation of the entrepreneur’s
preferences, the details of which are given in Appendix A. In particular, such speciﬁcation allows for
the entrepreneur’s disutility from eﬀort to depend on the size of the capital stock she manages. This
scenario will be considered in Section 5.
3In Section 4 we will relax this restriction by considering the case in which the entrepreneur is
relatively impatient.
4given by σ|ht,kt+1, her continuation value is denoted by ω(σ|ht,kt+1). The investor’s
is denoted by v(σ|ht,kt+1).
A contract σ is said to be feasible if, at all times and after any history, eﬀort
recommendations belong to the set A and the resource constraint is satisﬁed. More
formally,
Deﬁnition 1 A contract σ is feasible if, for all t ≥ 1,
at(ht−1,kt) ∈ A,∀ ht−1, (1)
and
0 ≤ ct(ht) ≤ θtf(kt) + (1 − δ)kt − kt+1(ht−1,kt),∀ ht. (2)
The incentive compatibility constraint (3) rules out one–shot deviations from the
investor’s eﬀort recommendation plan at all dates and after all histories.






u(ct(ht)) − a + βω(σ|ht,kt+1)
￿
g(θt|a)dθt. (3)
The fact that the set A is a connected subset of <+ suggests that rewriting (3) as a
ﬁrst–order condition may be handy. In the literature, this is known as the ﬁrst–order
approach, which is not universally valid. To ensure its validity, we follow Rogerson
(1985a) and Spear and Srivastava (1987) in assuming that the Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property and the Convexity of the Conditional Distribution Condition hold.
Let Ω be the set of pairs (k,ω) such that there exists a feasible and incentive




(k,ω) ∈ ∆ | ∃ σ s.t. (1),(2),(3),k0 = k, and ω(σ|h0) = ω
￿
.
In Appendix A we show that Ω can be recovered by adapting the algorithm developed
by Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti (1990). Then, for every (k,ω) ∈ Ω, we deﬁne the
set of the investor’s expected discounted utilities that can be generated by a feasible
and incentive compatible contract:
Φ(k,ω) =
￿
v(σ|h0) | (1), (2), (3),k0 = k, and ω(σ|h0) = ω
￿
.
For given (k,ω), the investor’s problem is to choose a feasible and incentive com-
patible contract σ that attains the maximum element in Φ(k,ω).4 Denote such ele-
ment as v∗(k,ω). Proposition 2 shows that the function v∗(k,ω) is a ﬁxed point of an
4Proposition 1 in Appendix A proves that Φ(k,ω) is compact.
5operator, denoted as T, which maps the space of bounded and continuous functions













u(c(θ)) − a + βω0(θ)
￿






u(c(θ)) − a + βω0(θ)
￿
g(θ|a)dθ, (5)
0 ≤ c(θ) ≤ θf(k) − k0 + k(1 − δ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, (6)
a∗ ∈ A, (7)
(k0,ω0(θ)) ∈ Ω ∀θ ∈ Θ. (8)
Since the operator T satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction,
the contraction mapping theorem ensures that the ﬁxed point is unique. Solving
for it also yields policy functions for recommended eﬀort a(k,ω), entrepreneur’s cash
ﬂows c(k,ω,θ), and continuation utility ω0(k,ω,θ), which can be used to recover the
constrained–eﬃcient contract in a straightforward manner.
Unfortunately an analytical characterization of the constrained Pareto–optimal
contract is not possible. For this reason we make assumptions about functional forms
and parameters (see below) and characterize the contract by means of numerical
methods. The algorithms that were designed to approximate the set Ω and the value
function are described in Appendix B.
2.1 Numerical Implementation
Our functional forms assumptions for preferences and technology are standard in the
macroeconomics literature. We posit that u(·) belongs to the CRRA class, i.e. u(c) =
c1−χ
1−χ , χ > 0, χ 6= 1. The production function is f(k) = kα, α ∈ (0,1). Furthermore,
we assume that A = [0,¯ a] and Θ = {θl,θh}, with θh > θl and G(θl|a) = e−a.5
While this choice of conditional distribution is dictated mostly by tractability, it has
appealing features. The probability of a good outcome is zero if no eﬀort is exerted,
and goes to 1 as eﬀort goes to inﬁnity. Furthermore, the marginal eﬀect of eﬀort on
the probability of success is decreasing in the eﬀort itself. From now on, all variables
that are contingent on the shock realization will be denoted with the subscripts l or
h.
5The upper bound ¯ a will be chosen so as to ensure it never binds.




)[θhkα − ch + βv(k0,ωh)] + e−a∗
[θlkα − cl + βv(k0,ωl)]
+ k(1 − δ) − k0 (P)
s.t. (1 − e−a∗
)[u(ch) + βωh] + e−a∗
[u(cl) + βωl] − a∗ = ω, (9)
a∗ ∈ argmax (1 − e−a)[u(ch) + βωh] + e−a [u(cl) + βωl] − a, (10)
0 ≤ ci ≤ θikα − k0 + (1 − δ)k ∀ i = h,l, (11)




∈ Ω ∀ i = h,l. (13)
The parameter values are reported in Table 1. Even though we set β,χ,α, and δ to
values that are standard in the macroeconomics literature, we wish to emphasize that
by no means should this be considered a calibration exercise.
The comparative statics exercises presented in Section 4 indicate that the choice
of χ is particularly relevant. In our benchmark, we set χ = 0.5 because of the rapidly
amassing experimental evidence in favor this value.6
k ¯ k β χ α δ θh θl ω
0 3.5 0.95 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.4 10.5
Table 1: Parameter Values.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium value set Ω and the value function. As ex-
pected, the range of values that is feasible and incentive compatible to promise the
entrepreneur is wider, the higher the level of capital.
The value function is nothing but the expected discounted value of the cash ﬂows
that will accrue to the investor. For this reason, it can be thought of as outside
equity. The illustration in the right panel shows that it is strictly increasing in the
level of capital and strictly decreasing in the entrepreneur’s promised utility ω. When
the value function is diﬀerentiable, these properties follow from the application of
the envelope theorem. In all of our computations, the value function is also globally
concave. However, since standard suﬃcient conditions for concavity are not satisﬁed
(the constraint set of the dynamic problem is not convex), we cannot assert this as a
general property.
6See for example Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007), Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2002), and
Holt and Laury (2002).
























































Figure 1: Set Ω and Value Function.
Given a pair (k,ω) ∈ Ω, we denote as C(k,ω) the expected discounted cost to the
investor of delivering ω to the entrepreneur, when the current capital stock is k. The
function C(k,ω) is the solution to the following functional equation:







where the asterisks designate the optimal choices generated by problem (P). The
























Figure 2: Inside Equity.
Notice that C(k,ω) is also the expected discounted value of the cash ﬂows that
will accrue to the entrepreneur. For this reason, we will often refer to it as the value of
8inside equity. It is intuitive that it is increasing in both capital and promised utility.
3 Properties of the Optimal Contract
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the properties of the optimal incentive
scheme and its implications for ﬁrm dynamics. We ﬁnd it convenient to start by
illustrating the optimal contracts that obtain in two simpler environments. In Section
3.1 we will consider the static case, i.e. the scenario where the relationship between
investor and entrepreneur lasts only one period. In Section 3.2 we will analyze the case
of inﬁnitely repeated interaction without capital accumulation. Finally, in Section 3.3,
we will tackle the general case.
3.1 The Static Case
Let ui ≡ c
1−χ
i /(1 − χ). With some abuse of notation, also deﬁne the inverse of
the utility function as c(u) = [(1 − χ)u]1/(1−χ). It yields the cost to the investor of
delivering a certain level of utility and is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
We ﬁnd it convenient to let the investor choose utilities rather than cash–ﬂows.





)[θhkα − c(uh)] + e−a∗
[θlkα − c(ul)] − δk,
s.t. (1 − e−a∗
)uh + e−a∗
ul − a∗ = ω, (14)
a∗ = log(uh − ul), (15)
0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα − δk), ∀ i = h,l.
The eﬀort chosen by the entrepreneur is a simple, monotone increasing function of
the utility spread s ≡ uh − ul. A higher eﬀort is implementable only by increasing
the gap between contingent rewards. Using (14) and (15) to express uh and ul as








[θhkα − c(uh)] +
1
s
[θlkα − c(ul)] − δk,
s.t. uh = 1 + ω + log(s),
ul = 1 + ω + log(s) − s,
0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα − δk) ∀ i = h,l.
9Notice that the choice of s pins down the payoﬀs of the lottery oﬀered to the en-
trepreneur {1+ω+log(s),1+ω+log(s)−s}, along with the the respective probabilities
{1 − 1/s,1/s}.
Necessary condition for an interior solution to the above optimization problem is
1
s2[θh − θl]kα =
1







The left–hand side is the marginal gain in expected revenues resulting from the in-
crease in the probability of a good outcome. The right–hand side is the marginal
increase in the cost of compensating the entrepreneur. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the
increased probability of awarding uh rather than ul. The second term reﬂects the
marginal impact on the expected cost arising from an increase in the risk imposed
on the entrepreneur. By strict concavity of the utility function, this terms is also
positive.
Condition (16) can be used to characterize the comparative statics of s with respect
to ω and k, respectively. Notice ﬁrst that a larger k implies a strictly higher marginal
revenue, but has no eﬀect on the marginal cost. Therefore, the choice of s will be
strictly increasing in k. Now consider the eﬀect of an increase in ω. The marginal
revenue does not change. The ﬁrst term of the marginal cost always increases. This
follows from strict concavity of the utility function and from the fact that higher ω
implies higher utility in both states of nature. The eﬀect on the second term depends
on the third derivative of the inverse of the utility function. It will be non–negative as
long as χ ≥ 1/2. This means that the latter inequality is also a suﬃcient condition,
although not necessary, for the optimal choice of s to be decreasing in ω. In fact, in
the case of our parameterization s is decreasing in ω for much lower values of χ.
We conclude that in the static model (i) higher capital elicits higher eﬀort and (ii)
awarding larger spreads s is costlier the higher the level of promised utility. It follows
that the recommended level of eﬀort decreases with ω.
3.2 Dynamics without Capital Accumulation
We now consider the case in which the time horizon is inﬁnite, but there is no capital
accumulation. This scenario is very close to those analyzed by Spear and Srivastava
(1987) and Wang (1997). It diﬀers from the former in that we impose limited liability,
i.e. the entrepreneur’s cash–ﬂow must be non–negative. It diﬀers from the latter, since
Wang assumes the eﬀort choice to be binary. With slight abuse of notation, let now
s ≡ uh + βωh − (ul + βωl). When recommended eﬀort is strictly positive, it is still














[θlkα − c(ul) + βv(ωl)] − δk,
s.t. uh = ω + 1 + log(s) − βωh,
ul = ω + 1 + log(s) − s − βωl,
0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα − δk) ∀ i = h,l,
ωi ∈ Ω ∀ i = h,l.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to s yields the analogue of condition (16):
1
s2[θh − θl]kα +
β
s2[v(ωh) − v(ωl)] =
1







The forces that shape the optimal spread of utilities across states are essentially
the same as in the static case. The only diﬀerence is that the marginal beneﬁt
of increasing eﬀort also depends on the diﬀerence between the investor’s contingent
continuation values.
The main innovation is that now the investor has the opportunity to distribute
utility awards both across states and over time. If the value function is diﬀerentiable,












c0(uil), i = h,l, (18)
where si, uih, and uil denote next period’s choices contingent on the current state
of nature being i. Condition (18) is analogous to condition 2.2 in Rogerson (1985b).
As in Rogerson (1985b), the value of χ determines the dynamics of entrepreneurial
consumption. For χ < 1, payments to the entrepreneur follow a sub–martingale, while
for χ > 1 they follow a super–martingale. This result, however, does not necessarily
generalize to scenarios where the limited liability constraint binds. This is relevant
to us, as in our parameterization that constraint does bind for large enough ω.
Figure 3 plots the optimal policies for the entrepreneur’s current and promised
utility, respectively. The investor strives to equate the marginal costs of rewarding
the entrepreneur across periods. For this reason all utility awards, both current and
future, are increasing in ω. If the intuition gained in the static case generalized to
the one under analysis here, one would also expect the spread between contingent
utility awards to decrease with ω, both in the present and in the future. According
to Figure 3, this happens for relatively low ω, but not for larger values. For relatively
11high levels of the state variable, the gap between uh and ul actually widens. The
reason is that, as just argued, the limited liability constraint ul ≤ u(θlkα − δk)
binds. This implies a tension between the objectives of minimizing the distance
between marginal costs of utility awards across periods and across states. When the
limited liability constraint binds, raising the entrepreneur’s expected current payoﬀ
necessarily requires increasing the spread in current utilities. Our conjecture is that
if the investor was able to borrow in the bad state of nature, so that the resources
available to her were the same as in the good state, optimal recommended eﬀort and
the utility spread s would converge to zero as ω goes to the upper bound of Ω. That
is, eventually the entrepreneur would achieve perfect insurance (and would exert not
eﬀort).7

























Figure 3: Compensation Policies.
In spite of the fact that, as argued above, the suﬃcient condition for entrepreneurial
consumption to be a sub–martingale does not hold always, our simulations show that
ω converges to the maximum element in the set Ω. By the limited liability constraint,
this also implies that the investor’s payoﬀ converges to zero, its lower bound.
3.3 Dynamics with Capital Accumulation
We now turn to the general case with capital accumulation. Figure 4 depicts the
policy functions for current and promised utility. In the left panel, we have plotted
ui(k,ω), i = h,l. In the right panel, we have pictured the contingent variation in
promised utility ωi(k,ω) − ω, i = h,l. For given capital stock, the entrepreneur’s

























































Figure 4: Compensation Policies.
contingent compensation schedules display the same qualitative features as those in
the case with no accumulation. The spread between continuation utilities appears to
be decreasing in ω, while the spread between current utilities is decreasing in ω for
low values and increasing for high values. Once again, this is due to the fact that the
limited liability constraint binds in the bad state of nature.
The optimality conditions for s and ui, i = h,l, are the analogues of equations
(17) and (18). Refer to the left panel of Figure 5. Consistent with the intuition
developed in previous sections, recommended eﬀort is increasing in the capital stock






















































Figure 5: Policy Functions for Eﬀort and Net Investment.
The novelty is capital accumulation. The policy function for net investment is
rendered in the right panel of Figure 5, were we plotted max[0,k0(k,ω) − k]. The
13most interesting feature is that, for given capital, net investment is declining in ω.
We can use the optimality conditions to understand why this is the case.





























αkα−1 + (1 − δ) > 0. (20)





s2(θh − θl)αkα−1 ∂s
∂ω
.
Since ∂s/∂ω < 0, the latter says that the marginal value of increasing capital is
decreasing in ω. The higher ω, the lower the utility spread s and the probability of
success. In turn, this leads to a lower marginal value of investment.
Now ﬁx k and consider the eﬀect of increasing ω on the optimal choice of invest-










∂ω, is positive. An higher ω today leads to a lower utility
spread s, which in turn increases the probability of a bad outcome. Since ωh > ωl, this
means that the eﬀect on the marginal gain is positive. On the other hand, since ωh and













negative. In our simulations, the latter eﬀect dominates. Investment decreases with
ω.
The simulation of the system starting from an arbitrary point in the state space
sheds more light on the forces shaping its dynamics. Refer to Figure 6. The state
space is partitioned in four subsets. The policy for capital is such that k0(k,ω) > k in
regions A and B, and k0(k,ω) < k otherwise. The dynamics of promised utility is such
that in regions B and C, ωh(k,ω) > ω > ωl(k,ω). In region A, ω always increases. In
region D, it always decreases. In light of our previous discussion, it is not surprising
that the locus separating regions B and C, along which net investment is identically
zero, is downward sloping for most values of k.
For relatively low initial conditions, the scatter plot illustrates the dynamics of
the state variables. The paths followed by the other relevant variables are shown in
Figure 7. When k and ω are relatively low, the marginal product of capital is high
and providing incentives is relatively inexpensive. Therefore the returns to investment




































Figure 6: Sample Path.







































Figure 7: Sample Path.
are high. Capital grows in both states of nature. During the transition towards the
locus separating the partitions B an C, all other variables also increase on average.
However, increases in both ω and k lead to a progressive reduction in the marginal
gain from capital accumulation. Once reached the locus, incentive provision becomes
so expensive to discourage investment. From that moment onwards, positive shocks
15lead to contemporaneous increases in current and future payouts to the entrepreneur,
and to lower investment and lower eﬀort in the next period. The opposite is true,
conditional on negative shocks. Therefore, inside equity, eﬀort, and capital are pos-
itively correlated with each other. The continuation value of the investor’s claim is
negatively correlated with all of them. Because of the sub–martingale property de-
scribed above, on average ω increases and capital decreases. As a consequence, eﬀort
and outside equity also decrease on average.
Eventually the system converges to a stationary point where outside equity is
zero and the entrepreneur’s promised utility lies on the upper contour of the set Ω.
The constrained–eﬃcient arrangement prescribes that in the limit the entrepreneur
controls the totality of the cash–ﬂow rights. Notice further that, even in such predica-
ment, she will not achieve full insurance and therefore her eﬀort will be strictly pos-
itive. The latter result is a consequence of our assumptions on limited liability. As
already noted in Section 3.2, if the investor had access to a competitive insurance
market, the entrepreneur would end up receiving full insurance and exerting no ef-
fort.
Staring at Figure 8 conﬁrms what we have learned so far. We have initialized the
system by assigning to the state variables the same initial conditions used to construct
Figure 7. Then we have conducted a large number of 80–period long simulations.
Figure 8 reports the simple averages. Early on all variables tend to increase. However,
once ω reaches a certain value, eﬀort, capital, proﬁts and the value of the investor’s
claim start decreasing.
We close this Section by emphasizing two implications of our theory that we ﬁnd
of particular interest. The ﬁrst is that it provides a novel rationale for the assumption
of limited span of managerial control, i.e. for the idea that the amount of productive
resources that it is eﬃcient to put under a manager’s control is bounded (see Lucas
(1978)). Even in the case in which the production function displayed constant returns
to scale, our theory would still predict that ﬁrm size converges. This is the case
because the process for ω would still be a sub–martingale, and promised utility would
eventually become so high (and incentive provision so costly) to discourage further
investment.
The second property is what we call capital overshooting. Our theory predicts
that, on the transition to its rest point, capital overshoots its long–run value. As far
as we know, this feature is unique to our framework. In other papers that study ﬁrm
dynamics in environments with repeated hidden information, capital is always weakly


































Figure 8: Average Dynamics.
lower then its long–run value.8
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we document how the optimal contract and the implied dynamics
change when we select alternative values for either the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion χ, or the entrepreneur’s discount factor, or the support of the conditional
distribution Θ.
4.1 The case of χ > 1
The analysis conducted so far shows that the optimal contract is back–loaded. That
is, the payoﬀ to the entrepreneur is stochastically increasing over time. How general
is this feature?
In a simpler environment, without capital accumulation, Rogerson (1985b) showed
that it is not robust to increases in the relative risk aversion beyond 1 (χ > 1, in our
notation).9
8See for example Brusco and Ropero (2007), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Quadrini (2003)
and DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2008).
9See his Proposition 3.
17Our numerical results tell us that the same holds true here. Figure 9 depicts the
frequency distribution that obtains by running a very long simulation of our model
for χ = 2. Diﬀerently from the benchmark case discussed above, the optimal contract
implies a non–degenerate stationary distribution, with most of the mass clustered
around a downward–sloping curve which is the analogue of the locus partitioning the
set Ω in Figure 6. Once again, this feature reﬂects the fact that the marginal gain
from investing is decreasing in the promised utility ω.

















Figure 9: Stationary Distribution for χ = 2.
The intuition behind this result is rather simple. As the risk aversion coeﬃcient
increases, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution decreases. In turn, this implies
that distorting intertemporally the entrepreneur’s consumption proﬁle by postponing
her consumption is costlier. Constrained–optimality requires the lender to leave more
resources to the entrepreneur early on.
4.2 An Impatient Entrepreneur
Throughout Section 3 it was assumed that entrepreneur and investor discount future
utility ﬂows at the same rate. Here we consider the case in which the entrepreneur
discounts future utility at the rate ρ < β. To start with, Ω, the set of implementable
utility levels is now smaller. The reason is that incentive provision is more expensive.


































Figure 10: Average Dynamics for χ = 2.
In a sense, the investor’s ability to spread compensation over time is compromised.
Figure 11 compares the policy functions with those obtained in the benchmark
case. Given the entrepreneur’s preference for early consumption, the optimal contract
calls for a change in the time proﬁle of her cash ﬂows in favor of the current period. In
part, this is accomplished by increasing the distribution to the entrepreneur in the low
state. Since the limited liability constraint binds, this translates into fewer resources
available for investment. The distribution contingent on high state also increases, to
an extent that increases the income risk imposed on the entrepreneur. In turn this
increases the marginal cost of eliciting eﬀort. This is why the latter drops.
The implications for dynamics is that, similarly to the case of χ > 1, the ergodic
set is no longer degenerate. There will be a stationary distribution, whose shape
resembles that depicted in Figure 9.
4.3 The Role of Risk
Figure 12 gives a rendering of the impact of simultaneously lowering θh and raising
θl, thereby reducing the gap between the two realizations of the productivity shock.
Once again, the policy functions are compared to those that obtain in the benchmark
case of which in Section 3.















Contingent Variation in Promised Utility
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Current Utility Entitlement (ω)
Figure 11: Policy Functions. Solid: benchmark. Dashed: ρ = 0.945
Net investment increases. The reason is that, for higher θl, more resources are
available for distribution to the entrepreneur in the current period, conditional on low
shock realization. For given intertemporal distribution of payoﬀs to the entrepreneur,
this allows to narrow the gap between current conditional cash ﬂows accruing to the
entrepreneur. In turn this means that, for all continuation values ω0, the marginal
gain from investment will be higher.
The decrease in eﬀort is the net result of two opposing forces. On the one end,
as just argued, a higher θl results in a lower marginal cost of eliciting eﬀort. On the
other hand, the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort also drops, as the gap θh − θl closes. The
latter turns out to dominate.
5 On Capital and the Utility Cost of Eﬀort
So far we have assumed that the marginal impact of eﬀort on expected revenues is
proportional to eaf(k), an expression which is clearly increasing in the size of the ﬁrm.
However, we have posited that the marginal utility cost of exerting eﬀort is invariant
with respect to ﬁrm size. If we think of one unit of eﬀort as the accomplishment of
one task, it is easy to think of situations in which the latter assumption looks sensible.
Think, for example, at the hiring of a new factory ﬂoor technician. The eﬀort required
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Current Utility Entitlement (ω)
Figure 12: Policy Functions. Solid: benchmark. Dashed: θh = 1.45, θl = 0.45.
should be independent of the number of technicians already employed. However, there
are also instances in which the same assumption is not as appealing. This is the case,
for example, when the decision involves the purchase of a new software for budget
control. The idea is that the larger the ﬁrm, the wider the set of software systems with
which a new one has to dialogue. Therefore the associated cost should be higher.10
In this section, we allow for a more general speciﬁcation of the utility cost of eﬀort.
The entrepreneur’s preferences are now given by u(c) − akϕ. The marginal cost of
exerting eﬀort will be increasing or decreasing with size, depending on the sign of the
parameter ϕ.
Recall that in the benchmark scenario, everything else equal, recommended eﬀort
is increasing in the level of capital. This is the case, because capital only impacts
(positively) the marginal revenue eﬀect of increasing the utility spread s. Introducing
the interaction of capital and eﬀort in the entrepreneur’s utility function has the
potential of enriching the range of the model’s empirical implications. When ϕ > 0,
the marginal utility cost of eﬀort is increasing in capital. In turn, that will make
eﬀort less attractive for the entrepreneur. The opposite will happen for ϕ < 0. This
intuition is conﬁrmed by the expression for optimal eﬀort. Given the utility spread s
10See Baker and Hall (2004) for an insightful digression on this issue.
21and the level of capital k, the entrepreneur will choose a∗(k,ω) = log(s) − ϕlog(k).
The ﬁrst–order condition for s now reads













[ω + kϕ(1 − log(kϕ)) + kϕ log(s) − s − ul].
The comparative statics of s with respect to k is now more involved and nothing
ensures that utility spread and eﬀort are increasing in capital. In fact, we will show
an example in which both are lower, the smaller the capital stock.
Letting the utility cost of eﬀort depend on size impacts all features of the constrained–


























Compare this expression with (20), its counterpart in the benchmark scenario. Recall
that a ≥ 0 implies s ≥ kϕ. Increasing capital has still a positive eﬀect on revenues,
given by the ﬁrst two addenda. The last addendum reﬂects the eﬀect on the costs
of delivering compensation. Its sign will be that of the parameter ϕ. When ϕ < 0,
i.e. when the marginal utility cost of eﬀort is decreasing in size, the marginal impact
on costs will be negative. It follows that we will have
∂v(k,ω)
∂k ≥ 0 as in Section 3.
However, when ϕ ≥ 0, increasing capital will adversely aﬀect that cost. In principle,
there may exist levels of ϕ large enough that the marginal gain of adding capital is
indeed negative.
Figure 13 illustrates how the system’s dynamics changes when we consider strictly
positive values for ϕ. It shows averages for a large number of 80–period long simula-
tions, in the cases of ϕ = 0, 0.1, and 0.3, respectively. As expected, a larger ϕ means
slower capital accumulation and lower payoﬀs for the investor. With the exception of
the ﬁrst few periods, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ and its eﬀort exertion are also lower.11
6 Auto–Correlated Shocks
The model we have analyzed so far assumes that a successful performance of the en-
trepreneur only aﬀects the probability distribution of the shock θ in the same period.
11For ϕ = 0.3, eﬀort is actually increasing in ϕ. This is the only novel qualitative feature resulting
from ϕ > 0. The reason is that for k < 1, the marginal utility cost of increasing eﬀort is decreasing
in ϕ.


































Figure 13: Average Dynamics. Dashed: ϕ = 0.1. Dash–Dot: ϕ = 0.3
Although it is shared by most of the literature on dynamic hidden action models,12
one may ﬁnd this assumption to be particularly removed from reality. In this sec-
tion we address this concern by assuming that a successful outcome also alters the
probability distribution in the future. We posit that next period’s distribution con-
ditional on success in the current period, G(θ0|a0,θh), stochastically dominates the
same distribution conditional on failure, i.e. G(θ0|a0,θl), for all a0. In the numerical
implementation, we assume that prob(θ0 = θh|θ = θi) = 1 − e−ψia, with ψh > ψl.13
Figure 14 illustrates value and policy functions along the ω dimension, for given
capital stock. Solid lines refer to ψh = 1.4, while dashed line refer to ψl = 0.8. All
the other parameters are as described in Table 1. As expected, eﬀort, investment,
and outside equity are lower conditional on ψ = ψl. Perhaps more interestingly,
cash–ﬂows accruing to he entrepreneur both in the current and future periods are
higher, conditional on ψ = ψl. That is, ci(k,ω,ψl) > ci(k,ω,ψh) and ωi(k,ω,ψl) >
ωi(k,ω,ψh) for all ω and for i = h,l. The result that cl(k,ω,ψl) > cl(k,ω,ψh) is a
direct consequence of two facts: (i) the limited liability constraint binds in the low
12For example, see Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Wang (1997).
13Notice that our modeling choice is diﬀerent from that of Fernandes and Phelan (2000). In their
case, next period’s distribution depends on current eﬀort (which is private information), rather than
on current realization (public information).
23state of nature and (ii) investment is lower conditional on ψ = ψl.
Contingent variations in promised utility are lower when ψ = ψh because of the
negative complementarity between the two state variables, which we have described
in Section 3. Since the marginal gain of raising ω is decreasing in k and the choice of
k0 is higher when ψ = ψh, the optimal choices of ωh and ωl will have to be lower.
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Figure 14: Policy Functions. Case with State–Dependent Shock Distribution
Figure 15 illustrates the eﬀects of persistence on the dynamics of all relevant vari-
ables. Similarly to the cases considered above, the value of outside equity converges
to zero and the entrepreneur ends up controlling all cash–ﬂow rights. However, the
ergodic set for the state variables is now a non–degenerate subset of Ω’s upper con-
tour. As the investor’s payoﬀ settles down to its long–run value, the other variables
are time–varying. Since a good shock today implies a more favorable probability
distribution tomorrow, promised utility, investment, and recommended eﬀort are all
higher following a good shock.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have characterized the ﬁrm dynamics implied by constrained–eﬃcient
contracts between a risk–neutral investor and a risk–averse entrepreneur under the
assumption that the latter’s eﬀort is not publicly observable.





































Figure 15: Sample Path. Case with State–Dependent Shock Distribution
A robust feature of the model is the sub–modularity of the value function. That
is, the marginal gain from investing declines with the level of promised utility. This
happens because the cost of incentive provision is increasing in ω. In turn, this means
that the higher ω, the lower constrained–eﬃcient eﬀort and the probability of success,
and therefore the lower the return to capital accumulation.
Consistent with a widely cited result by Rogerson (1985b), when the entrepreneur’s
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient is less than 1 and the two agents are equally impa-
tient, on average ω and the value of inside equity grow over time. Because its marginal
product of capital is relatively high, a small ﬁrm will see its capital grow over time.
However, because of the sub–modularity property, the rise in the value of inside eq-
uity will imply a drop in the return to investment, which eventually will lead to a
decline in the capital stock. In this sense, our theory provides a rationale for ﬁrm’s
decline. This feature distinguishes our model from others in which repeated moral
hazard shapes ﬁrm dynamics. In those, ﬁrm size never overshoots its long–run level.
Interestingly, the constrained–eﬃcient contract prescribes that in the long run the
entrepreneur becomes the only claimant to the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows.
A key mechanism in our theory is that providing incentives to exert eﬀort becomes
costlier as the manager increases her stake in the ﬁrm. We believe that it would be
interesting to extend our framework by allowing for the possibility of termination.
25That is, by empowering the investor to liquidate the entrepreneur and hire someone
else to run operations. The insights provided by Spear and Wang (2005) may prove
useful in carrying out this task.
26A Proofs and Lemmas
The results that follow are shown under the assumption that the entrepreneur’s pref-
erences are represented by the utility function u(ct,m(at)l(kt)), which is assumed
to be bounded, strictly increasing and strictly concave in ct, and strictly decreas-
ing in m(at)l(kt). We assume that m(at) is increasing and convex in at and that
l : <+ → <+. We also assume that u(ct,m(at)l(kt)) is additively separable in the
arguments ct and m(at)l(kt).
Proposition 1 Φ(k,w) is compact, ∀(k,ω) ∈ Ω.
Proof. Fix the pair (k,ω). We already know that Φ(k,w) is bounded. It is left to
prove that it is also closed. Let {Vn} ⊆ Φ(k,w), where Vn → V∞ when n → ∞. We
need to show that V∞ ∈ Φ(k,w). In words, we need to demonstrate that there exists
a contract σ∞ that satisﬁes (1), (2), (3), ω(σ∞|h0) = w, and v(σ∞|h0) = V∞. Now we
will construct such an optimal contract σ∞. By the deﬁnition of Φ(k,w), there exists
a sequence of contracts {σn} = {an
t (ht−1),cn
t (ht)} and capital {kn
t+1(ht−1)}, where








t (ht) − kn
t+1(ht−1) + (1 − δ)kt]g(θt|an
t (ht−1))dht
For t = 1, notice that {an
1(h0),cn
1(h1)} and {kn
2(h0)} are ﬁnite collections of bounded















1 (h1) = c∞
1 (h1), and lim
nq→∞k
nq
2 (h0) = k∞
2 (h0).
We now consider t = 2. Notice that {an
2(h1),cn
2(h2)} and {kn
3(h1)} are ﬁnite col-
lections of bounded sequences, and we can deﬁne {a∞
2 (h1),c∞
2 (h2)} and {k∞
3 (h1}
similarly as we did for t = 1. If we iterate this procedure for t = 3,4,..., and let
σ∞ = {a∞
t (ht−1),c∞
t (ht)} along with k = {k∞
t+1(ht−1)}, then it is easy to verify that
the constructed contract σ∞ is what we desired for.
Proposition 2 v∗(k,ω) = T(v∗)(k,ω).
Proof. Fix ω, the lifetime discounted utility ensured by the optimal contract
to the agent, and k, the optimal capital level of the ﬁrm. First, we show that
27T(v∗)(k,ω) ≤ v∗(k,ω). This inequality is true if there exists a feasible and incen-
tive compatible contract σ such that ω(σ|h0) = ω and v(σ|h0) = T(v∗)(k,ω). The
desired contract σ can be constructed in the following way. Let a(k,ω), c(θ,k,ω),
k0(k,ω), and ω0(θ,k,ω) denote the solution of the maximization problem associated
with the deﬁnition of T(v∗)(k,ω). Now, let a1(h0) = a(k,ω), c1(h1) = c(θ1,k,ω), and
k2(h0) = k0(k,ω), ∀h1 along with k1 = k0. For the realization of θ in t = 1, denoted θ1
for the purpose of this proof, there exists a feasible and incentive compatible contract
σθ1 that ensures a level of expected discounted utility ω0(θ1,k,ω) to the agent, and
v∗(k0(k,ω),ω0(θ1,k,ω)) to the principal. Thus, we can say that σ|h1 = σθ1, ∀h1. It is
obvious that the constructed contract σ is what is desired.
We now need to show that v∗(k,ω) ≤ T(v∗)(k,ω). Let σ∗ be an optimal contract
that ensures a level of expected discounted utility of ω to the agent, given k. In
















where the last inequality is obtained by letting a(k,ω) = a∗(h0), c(θ,k,ω) = c∗
1(θ1),
ω0(θ,k,ω) = ω0∗|h0) along with k0(k,ω) = k∗
2(h0) and k1 = k0. This solution satisﬁes
the constraints (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8).
A.1 The APS Algorithm
In this Appendix, we show how results from Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti (1990) can
be adapted to our environment in order to deﬁne an iterative algorithm that allows
for the numerical approximation of the set Ω.
For any arbitrary Σ ∈ <2, deﬁne the operator B as




s.t. (4), (5),(6), (7), and (k0,wω0(θ)) ∈ Σ,∀θ}
Notice that the operator B is monotone, i.e. Σ1 ⊆ Σ2 implies that B(Σ1) ⊆ B(Σ2).
Following Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti (1990), we say that Σ is self–generating if
Σ ⊆ B(Σ).
28Proposition 3 (a) Ω is self–generating. (b) If Σ is self–generating, then B(Σ) ⊆ Ω.
Proof. To prove (a), let (k,ω) ∈ Ω. There exists a contract σ = {at(ht−1),ct(ht)}
and a sequence {kt+1(ht−1)} which satisfy the constraints (1), (2), (3), and ω(σ|h0) =
ω. We now say that
a(k,ω) = a1(h0); k0(k,ω) = k2(h0); c(θ,k,ω) = c1({θ}), ∀θ; ω0(θ,k,ω) = ω2(σ|{θ}), ∀θ.
It is obvious that {a(k,ω),c(θ,k,ω),k0(k,ω),ω0(θ,k,ω)}, deﬁned above, satisﬁes
the constraints (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8). Therefore, (k,ω) ∈ B(Ω), which demon-
strates that (a).
To prove (b), let Σ be self–generating, and let (k,ω)h0 ∈ B(Σ). We have to
construct a contract σ = {at(ht−1),ct(ht)} and a sequence kt+1(ht−1) = kh0 that
satisfy the constraints (1), (2), (3), and ω(σ|h0) = ωh0. We construct such a contract
recursively. First, there exist {a(kh0,ωh0),c(θ,kh0,ωh0),k0(kh0,ω h0),ω0(θ,kh0,ωh0)}







0 ≤ c(θ,kh0,ωh0) ≤ θf(k) − kh0 + (1 − δ)k.
For t = 1, let a1(h0) = a(kh0,ωh0) and c1(h1) = c(θ1,kh0,ωh0), ∀h1. Also, let
k0
h0 = kh1 = k0(kh0,ωh0) and ωh1 = ω0(θ,kh0,ωh0), ∀h1. Notice that (kh1,ωh1) ∈ Σ ∈
B(Σ) implies the existence of {a(kh1,ωh1),c(θ,kh1,ωh1),k0(kh1,ωh1),ω0(θ,kh1,ωh1)}







0 ≤ c(θ,kh1,ωh1) ≤ θf(k) − kh1 + (1 − δ)k.
We can iterate for t = 2,3,4,... to construct the complete proﬁle σ. We can then
observe that, by construction, for any arbitrary t ≥ 0 and ht,




Since 0 < β < 1 and the utilities are bounded, the above equation implies that
ω(σ|ht) = ωht ∀ t ≥ 0 and ∀ ht.
Hence, the contract that we have constructed is what is desired.
29Now deﬁne a closed and bounded set Ω0 such that Ω ⊆ Ω0. Recall that k ∈ [k,¯ k] ∈
<+. Let
Ω0 = {(k,ω) | k ∈ [k,¯ k] and ω ∈ [ω, ¯ ω(k)]},
where ω is set to an arbitrarily small positive number. We do not need to assume that
u(·) is positive–valued, since a positive monotone transformation can achieve this if
needed. Also, let ω(k) ≡
u(c,m(a)l(k))
1−β , where a = min{A} and c = θf(k), θ = max{Θ}.
Proposition 4 shows that (i) the set Ω is a ﬁxed point of the operator B and that
(ii) the sequence constructed by iterating on B starting with Ω0 converges to the set
Ω.
Proposition 4 (a) Ω = B(Ω). (b) Let X0 = Ω0, and let Xn+1 = B(Xn), for
n = 0,1,2,... Then, lim
n→∞
Xn = Ω.
Proof. Part (a) is obvious. To show part (b), we will ﬁrst show that the sequence
{Xn} is convergent. Obviously, B(X0) ⊆ X0. Next, we operate B on both sides
of this expression and obtain Xn+1 = B(Xn) ⊆ Xn, ∀n, because B is monotone







Xn. Now, we show that Ω ⊆ X∞. Given that Ω ⊆ X0, the
monotonicity property of B ensures that B(Ω) ⊆ B(X0). However, it must be true
that Ω = B(Ω), by part (a), and B(X0) = X1, by construction. Then, Ω ⊆ X1.
By iteration we obtain Ω ⊆ Xn, ∀n ≥ 0, and consequently, Ω ⊆ X∞. Now, we
demonstrate that X∞ ⊆ Ω. Given the properties of the sequence {Xn}, we have that
B(X∞) = X∞. Hence, X∞ is self–generating, and X∞ = B(X∞) ⊆ Ω.
B Algorithm
In this section we provide a brief description of the algorithm that was used to compute
a numerical approximation to the value function v(k,ω). Given that the equilibrium
value set Ω is not square, it is not eﬃcient to approximate the value function by
means of bi–dimensional splines. For this reason, we will restrict the choice of capital
to a ﬁnite number of levels and approximate the value function on the ω dimension
by means of cubic splines.
We start by deﬁning a ﬁne grid for the capital stock. Denote it as K ≡ {kj}
nk
j=1
and let the related set of indexes be J ≡ {j}
nk
j=1. The upper bound of K must be
chosen in such a way that the corresponding net investment will be negative for all ω.
For this to be the case, it is suﬃcient to set it equal to the eﬃcient capital stock when






task consists in approximating the equilibrium value set of the transformed problem.
B.1 Approximation of the Equilibrium Value Set
From the analysis conducted in Section 2, it follows that for every j ∈ J, the set
of feasible and incentive compatible values will be given by an interval [ω, ¯ ωj] ∈ <+.
This means that our task reduces to approximate the mapping Ω : K → <+ which is
given by the sequence {¯ ωj}j∈J. The mapping Ω can be shown to be increasing and
strictly concave.
Following Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti (1990), we start by deﬁning an initial
guess Ω0 = {¯ ω0j}j∈J. We impose that Ω0 is weakly increasing, weakly concave,
and such that ¯ ω0j ≥ ¯ ωj for all j. These requirements are satisﬁed by letting ¯ ω0j =
u(θhkα
nk−δknk)
1−β . Then, for every j,q ∈ J such that θlkα





[uh + βωh] + e−a[ul + βωl] − a (22)
s.t. 0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq),
ω ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ωnq
and
¯ ωn+1,j ≡ max
j
{bjq}. (23)
The operator deﬁned by (22)–(23) generates a sequence {Ωn} that converges to Ω.
Our approximation will be Ωm such that ||Ωm − Ωm−1||∞ < 10.0−8.





s.t. 0 ≤ ul ≤ u(θlkα + k(1 − δ) − kj),
ω ≤ ωl ≤ ¯ ωnj.
Obviously the solution calls for ul = u(θlkα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq) and ωl = ¯ ωnq. Alterna-
tively, when eﬀort is strictly positive, a = log(s), where s ≡ (uh + βωh − ul − βωl).
The optimization problem then becomes
max
s,uh,ωh
uh + βωh − 1 − log(s)
s.t. 0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq),
ω ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ωnq.
31In this case the solution calls for ui = u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq) and ωi = ¯ ωnq.
B.2 Approximation of the Value Function
For every j ∈ J, we deﬁne a coarse grid Zj = {ωjz}
nω
z=1 over the interval [ω, ¯ ωj].
We also deﬁne an initial guess for the value function: v0j : Zj → <+. For all other
ω ∈ [ω, ¯ ωj], the guess is approximated by a cubic spline which we denote as v0j(ω).
We impose that v0j(ω) is decreasing and concave in ω for all j ∈ J and that the
function is increasing and concave in capital. Then, for all z and every j,q ∈ J such
that θlkα




)[θhkα − c(uh) + βvnq(ωh)] + e−a∗
[θlkα − c(ul) + βvnq(ωl)]
+ kj(1 − δ) − kq, (24)
s.t. (1 − e−a∗
)[uh + βωh] + e−a∗
[ul + βωl] − a∗ = ωjz,
a∗ = argmax (1 − e−a)[uh + βωh] + e−a[ul + βωl] − a,
0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq) ∀ i = h,l,
a∗ ≥ 0,





The operator deﬁned by (24)–(25) generates a sequence Vn ≡ {vnj}j∈J. Our
approximation of the value function on the grid will be Vm such that ||Vm−Vm−1||∞ <









[θhkα − c(uh) + βvnq(ωh)] +
1
s
[θlkα − c(ul) + βvnq(ωl)]
+ kj(1 − δ) − kq,
s.t. ωh = [ωjz + 1 + log(s) − uh]/β,
ωl = [ωjz + 1 + log(s) − s − ul]/β,
0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq) ∀ i = h,l,
ω ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ωq ∀ i = h,l.
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